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Atomic Dreams: Exploring the Promise of
Nuclear Energy in Central-Eastern Europe
Ryann Welch
University of Florida

Abstract
Energy production and economic potential have been intertwined for centuries. Is
nuclear energy a failed experiment, or the future of European energy? Nuclear energy has
been scrutinized heavily for decades, especially in light of incidents such as Chernobyl and
Fukushima. Issues of safe operation, radioactive waste storage, and threats to human health
plague this energy source. However, Central-Eastern Europe’s nuclear energy production
has been increasing in terms of both production and investment, especially in the Visegrad
Four states. The European Union’s stance on nuclear energy is not black and white. While
Western European member countries like Germany and France are moving away from this
energy source, Eastern member states are expanding their nuclear production and consumption. As the European Union sets strict guidelines for nuclear operations while promoting
a renewable energy agenda, it allocates substantial funding to nuclear energy projects in
Central-Eastern European member and non-member states, in the name of regionalizing
approaches to energy production. What is causing increased nuclear energy production in
Europe, and how can the European Union rectify renewable energy agendas with regionalized energy funding? How will nuclear energy continue to affect Central-Eastern Europe in
global energy relations? This paper focuses on Hungary and Ukraine’s nuclear energy capabilities in particular, as they are both former communist states intending to modernize and
build economic independence. Hungary and Ukraine’s nuclear energy will be compared
in terms of economic capability, social support, and influence of the European Union and
Russia.
Keywords
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1.

Introduction
Historically, the countries with the greatest access to energy sources and production sites have held a strong grip on the regional and local economies. From early biomass
sources (like timber) to coal to steam, energy has evolved quickly and substantially through
the last centuries. The warmest years in the world have been recorded in the past 35 years.
Ocean levels have risen by six inches in the last century, and the frequency of severe storms
has increased since the mid-20th century. The generally environmentally-minded European
Union has composed energy plans to reduce its carbon footprint and decrease foreign energy dependency, including a 40% carbon emission reduction and a 20% increase in energy
efficiency by 2030, based on the levels reported in 1990 (European Union Climate Action,
2014). Just after the Second World War, European countries turned to nuclear power for
energy, for coal supplies had been depleted. In the 1950s, nuclear power was viewed as a
chance for self-reliance and rebuilding for Europe (Hoffman, 1957).
Nuclear power has been scrutinized heavily since it began providing energy, especially considering incidents at plants such as Chernobyl and Fukushima. Issues of safe
operation, radioactive waste storage, and threats to human health plague this energy source.
However, Central-Eastern Europe ’s nuclear energy production has been increasing despite
these concerns, and Europe as a whole has seen heavy investment in furthering nuclear production. The question of which energy sources are the most economical and productive has
become increasingly more relevant with new energy sources becoming available. Coal and
natural gas are becoming less efficient and less globally desirable. At the same time, renewable energy sources often do not have the infrastructure needed for substantial economic
development. For this reason, nuclear energy is a strong possibility for establishing a strong
economy, especially in countries desiring to establish greater political and economic sovereignty.
Two countries of particular interest in Central-Eastern Europe are Ukraine and
Hungary. Both countries are former communist states, with nuclear energy infrastructure
established and in use before the Soviet Union fell. They are both experiencing tangible
increases in nuclear energy, in terms of both production and economic investment, despite
decommissioning of nuclear plants by the European Commission and general skepticism
towards nuclear energy. Hungary has since joined the European Union, while Ukraine appears unlikely to follow. There is a vastly complicated history surrounding nuclear energy in
Central-Eastern Europe, as the impact of the Soviet system collides with modern European
Union policies in the same states. What is causing increased nuclear energy production in
Hungary and Ukraine, and what could these trends mean for the future of Central-Eastern
Europe?
This paper will explore economic factors, legislative factors, and public opinions
in both these countries and their role in further nuclear energy expansion, with a particular
emphasis on the influence of the European Union and Russia on Hungary and Ukraine,
respectively. Ultimately, the lures of increased economic independence, strong state-supported legislation, and problematic yet solid favorable public opinion have allowed the
presence of nuclear energy to expand in Ukraine and Hungary. This paper will ultimately
argue that different circumstances unique to each Central-Eastern European country explain
these current nuclear trends, though there are also similar desires and contexts for the two
countries. While economic independence and sovereignty appear to be the strongest factors
influencing expanded nuclear energy in Ukraine and Hungary, this paper finds that public
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/10
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support is a subtle yet fundamental factor in nuclear energy use as well.
2.

Methodology
Nuclear energy is a relatively new energy source, and many long-term environmental and economic consequences are not widely researched or published. Increased
nuclear energy trends are broadly explored in this paper. Nuclear energy investment, production, consumption, and public support are all factored into the discussion of increasing
nuclear trends. This paper will not explore nuclear technology used as weapons or for military purposes.
This paper is split into three major sections corresponding to three factors best
explaining increased nuclear energy use in Hungary and Ukraine: economic, political, and
social. Economic support for nuclear energy production increases is largely derived from
scholarly research, with supplemental data as available from the European Union and European Commission. Legislative information supporting nuclear energy is mostly taken from
the agreements between the European Union and the United States, coupled with scholarly
discussion of this legislation. Finally, public opinion data is cited from European Union surveys, as well as scholarly analysis of petitions, gatherings, and publications, to create a sense
of general public discourse surrounding nuclear energy.
3.

Background: The Soviet Period in Nuclear Energy
The idea of “atomic-powered communism”arose in the late 1950s, when the Soviet Union initiated several power connections between Soviet Republics, mainly using
nuclear energy as a common and efficient source of power (Kasperski, 2015a). For Soviet
authorities, scientists, and citizens, nuclear energy was the key towards economic advancement and fulfilling the social greatness promised by communism (Kasperski, 2015a). Consequently, the rise of nuclear energy was generally celebrated across communist countries
in Eastern Europe. Before the Chernobyl accident, nuclear energy innovation was greatly
encouraged and supported in Ukraine and much of Eastern Europe.
The Chernobyl accident, in which an improperly performed safety test triggered
overheating and finally an explosion in reactor number four of the Pripyat plant, forced a reevaluation of nuclear energy and its potential. Though Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus were
most affected, radioactive material from the explosion traveled as far as Sweden and Norway (Semenov, 1983). Therefore, Eastern Europe’s energy became an issue in every part of
Europe. Health impacts and further safety concerns tarnished nuclear energy's reputation,
causing decommissioning and distrust of this power source all over the world. Many scholars
have linked this accident to the fall of the Soviet Union, as the Pripyat plant’s destruction
indicated failure of Soviet technology and broke the promise of “atomic-powered communism.”
4.

The European Union
The European Union (EU) is a significant producer of energy in the world, where
exports account for over 50% of its energy production. Fossil fuels are responsible for nearly
half of the European Union's power supply, while nuclear power accounts for one-third
of power in the European Union (Pampel, 2011). Following climate change mitigation
objectives, the European Union aims to reduce carbon emissions by 40%, and to become
Nuclear Energy in Central-Eastern Europe
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the most energy efficient continent (European Commission, 2008). To increase energy
efficiency, the EU has connected several member and non-member states through energy
bridges, essentially creating a network of nuclear energy that can be exported between European countries. Out of the twenty-eight (as of 2016) member states, thirteen have active
nuclear plants, with major nuclear industries in France, Germany, and Hungary (European
Commission, 2008). Nuclear energy is responsible for nearly half of low-carbon power production in the European Union. The Official Journal of the European Union states the need
to “diversify Europe’s energy supply,” which a state running half on fossil fuel combustion
with a massive emission rate does not exemplify (European Commission, 2014).
5.

Current Trends in Hungary & Ukraine
While both are formerly Eastern European communist countries, the motivations
and means for furthered nuclear energy are greatly dependent on economic capacities and
historical contexts in Hungary and Ukraine. While Ukraine has a larger land area than Hungary, the number of reactors in each state are virtually proportionate to energy needs, with
four in Hungary and fifteen in Ukraine (World Nuclear Association, n.d.).
Since Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, its nuclear energy production
has been increasing. Around four nuclear plants power half of the country, the biggest of
which is the Paks plant (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). The European Commission has
extended deals with Hungary’s nuclear plant because there were no “alternative suppliers”
in case of an energy shortage, therefore increasing reliability and dependence on nuclear
energy from this country (European Commision, 2008). This extension also elongated the
life of two plants and commissioned construction of two more plants. Hungary also benefits
from the EU power bridge, connecting the nuclear power plants (NPP) of several member
and non-member states for mutual economic and energy supply benefit.
Ukraine is also a former communist country, but it is not a European Union member state. However, Ukraine has substantial economic ties to the European Union, practicing a policy of integration rather than Europeanization (Wolczuk, 2015). For example,
Ukraine benefits from the power bridge connecting many Central and Eastern European
countries’ energy supplies for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. While some plants are being decommissioned, there are intentions to replace and use them again in coming years.
Yet, the ghosts of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster linger in terms of public trust and support of
nuclear power (Bromet, 2014).
6.

Economic Opportunity as Means for Nuclear Energy
This paper will argue that economic development is the main factor for increased
nuclear interest in Central-Eastern Europe, however, the exact motivations and prospects
vary between the relevant countries. In the case of Ukraine, nuclear energy is intended to
create a truly Ukrainian economy, independent of Russia. However, Hungary does not
tie economic independence to decreased reliance. Hungary utilizes energy deals from the
European Union and European Commission to improve their nuclear capacity, essentially
valuing the idea of a stronger Hungary rather than an energy independent or self-reliant
Hungary.
The Ukrainian economy has lived in the shadow of Russia for decades, spanning
long before and long after the Soviet period. That being said, Ukraine is a strong and sighttps://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/10
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nificant nuclear energy producer, generating over 89.2 kilowatt hours of energy in 2010 and
holding a top-five position among nuclear energy producing countries (Kasperski, 2015b).
Further, the Ukrainian nuclear sector employs nearly 40,000 people as of 2015 (Kasperski,
2015b). The nuclear sector is at the forefront of the Ukrainian economy already, therefore
the economic goals follow modernization of nuclear technology and creating a fully Ukrainian energy system.
Despite Ukrainian efforts to decrease economic dependence on Russia, the two
countries’ nuclear energy sectors are intricately entwined. Kasperski (2015b) argues that
Ukraine’s nuclear technology is “actually Russian nuclear technology with all of its political
and economic baggage” (p. 59). While Ukraine possesses the necessary natural resources
(most importantly, uranium) and political desire to create a more independent energy sector
(Von Zon, 2014), most of the tools, technology, and processing stations are Russian. The
Crimean conflict, in which Russia annexed the Russian-speaking peninsula of Crimea from
Ukraine, catalyzed Ukrainian desire to create an independent and Russian-free economic
system even further. It seems that Ukrainians viewed this annexation as Russia taking what
was rightfully Ukrainian (Kasperski, 2015b). Therefore, Russian technology being used to
process uranium supplies and conducting reactor operations appears to be another aspect of
Russia involved in what is rightfully Ukrainian.
In terms of economic incentive for nuclear energy expansion, Hungary is not
necessarily in competition with another state or force. Rather, the Hungarian government
and people seem to desire a more prominent nuclear system for the purpose of becoming
a stronger country. As of now, 70% of Hungarian energy is imported, and this number
could raise to 90% if further action is not taken (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). Hungary
does not intend to have a totally Hungarian-produced energy sector like Ukraine desires.
Hungary is not a top nuclear-energy producing country, having just four nuclear reactors
compared to Ukraine’s fifteen. Since Hungary benefits from EU-sanctioned power bridges, clearly the intention behind expanding nuclear energy is not moving away from these
power bridges. The EU provides legislation and investment that aids Hungary in its pursuit
of more domestically produced energy, as the Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy
Union, an EU energy program, means to connect power structures to create an efficient
and strong European power supply. Since Hungary is a part of this plan, it will receive the
needed investment and political support from the European Union.
Despite different intents for expanding nuclear energy production, both Ukraine
and Hungary have attracted investors from other countries and from global businesses. In
terms of nuclear energy in Central-Eastern Europe, the economic deals and plans developed by these countries indicate a strong interest in nuclear energy from all over the world.
Therefore, other Central-Eastern European countries will likely experience similar investment incentives that inspire further nuclear energy expansion. Ukraine has seen its fair share
of external investors, though channeling these investments into an independent economic
future is far simpler planned than executed. The U.S. Department of State has invested in
Ukrainian nuclear energy, and Ukraine has imported U.S. nuclear fuel and materials1; however, it is largely a short-term solution.
In addition, there is economic potential for Ukraine to invest in other countries
and companies’ nuclear plans as well, indicating a healthy and developing market for this
1 Ukraine initially imported nuclear fuel from the Westinghouse company, and Energoatom has invested in
Ukrainian nuclear plants (World Nuclear Association n.d.).
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energy source. The European Union has shown interest in Ukraine as well, which indicates
that EU benefits may extend far past member states. Ukraine is connected along the EU
power bridge, as part of the Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union. In terms
of nuclear energy in Central-Eastern Europe, this indicates greater trends towards nuclear
energy development and production, since there are significant investment opportunities
from state sources in addition to independent companies.
Hungary’s investments both in and out of the country tend to be more tied to
other countries rather than independent companies. For example, Hungary has exported
nuclear power to South Korea, reflecting an international demand for efficient and costeffective nuclear power. Hungary is additionally a member of the Visegrad Four, along with
Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The Visegrad Four are former communist Central-Eastern European states that are pro-nuclear energy. Each of these countries has policies
to extend nuclear plant life spans, commission more reactors, and connect nuclear energy
systems and resources for a stronger Central-Eastern Europe (Nosko, 2010). Each of these
countries has strong policies and energy practices that encourage less reliance on natural gas
to limit Russian economic and political influence on their energy sectors. The Visegrad
Four creates further policy incentives to maintain nuclear energy expansion in Hungary,
while developing a sense of Eastern European solidarity and identity. Interestingly, Hungary has received over $10 million in investments from Russia for nuclear energy, which
Ukraine has strived to move away from (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). This begs the
question of whether Central-Eastern Europe will ever be fully economically free of Russian
influence, since Hungary has readily taken what Ukraine aims to fully reject.
7.

Legislative & Policy Support for Nuclear Energy Trends
Regardless of economic potential, it is necessary for the policy of these states to
support expanded nuclear energy production and consumption. Economic independence
remains the main factor in increased nuclear energy, and the degree to which policy and
legislation support this increase varies between Hungary and Ukraine. Hungary’s nuclearenergy-related legislation aims to expand current production and commission the construction of more power plants. Despite commonalities in expanding nuclear plant life, encouraging commissioning of further plants, and supporting economic investment in nuclear
technology, Hungary and Ukraine have fundamentally different goals for the future of their
energy sectors. Hungarian policies lean towards a strong Eastern European identity and a
stable economy, while Ukrainian policy mainly aims to create an economy independent
from Russia.
Both countries have domestic legislation supporting nuclear energy, however the
effectiveness of this legislation has varied greatly between the two. A similarity between
Ukrainian and Hungarian nuclear energy policies are agreements each county upholds with
the United States in regards to ethical use of technology and proper disposal of radioactive
waste. In both the 1991 U.S.-Hungary and the 1998 U.S.-Ukrainian agreements, the states
involved agree to abide by the declaration that “peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical
and thermal contamination.” The agreements address economic development of nuclear
energy in Ukraine and Hungary and state that “economic and safe conduct of their nuclear
programs” are a foremost objective (United States Congress, 1991; 1998).
Furthermore, the Hungarian and Ukrainian parliaments have passed legislation
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/10
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that supports a pro-nuclear policy. In 1993, Ukrainian Parliament ended a moratorium on
nuclear reactor construction that had been in place since the Chernobyl accident (Kasperski,
2015b). Hungarian Parliament voted to expand nuclear plant production and life by 20 years
with no safety or economic objections in the early 2000s, and in 2003 Ukrainian Parliament
also voted to extend nuclear plant lifetimes (Kasperski, 2015b).
Besides domestic parliamentary legislation, Hungary’s nuclear sector is also tied to
European Union legislation. Being a member state, Hungary is bound by European Union
standards for nuclear energy and radioactive waste disposal. The EU has also committed to
decreasing emissions by 35% and becoming the most energy-efficient continent, which provides political in addition to economic support for Hungary (European Commission, 2018).
While the EU does have general policies towards decommissioning nuclear plants and treating radioactive waste that apply to all member states, it leaves specific domestic policy up to
the member states. The goal of this approach is to allow economic stability and development
that is appropriate for the needs of every member state (Barnes, 2017).
It is necessary to address the European Union’s recent decommissioning of nuclear
plants in explaining its role in Eastern European nuclear energy policy. It is incorrect to say
that the European Union is necessarily against nuclear energy. The nuclear power plant
connection is not an exception to current policy. According to the European Commission
(2018), while nuclear plants are being decommissioned, they are to be replaced with more
modern plants. The European Union intends to replace outdated nuclear technology and
bring every plant up to current European Commission safety standards. Further, it is also
incorrect to state that the nuclear power bridge connections are solely for European Union
benefit. The European Union asserts member states’ “right to determine conditions for
exploiting their own resources” (European Commission, 2008). For nuclear power, the European Union affirms “strengthen[ing] the role of national regulatory authorities” to manage
nuclear plants with “independence from national governments” (European Commission,
2018, p. 1).
Ukrainian government tends to have difficulties in enforcing legislation, leaving
the actual investments virtually stuck or not as effective as desired. The first indication of a
solid policy in favor of a Russian-free nuclear sector occurred in 1995, when the Ukrainian
parliament approved legislation that intended to produce energy through solely Ukrainian means and technology (Kasperski, 2015b). However, the same legislation also revealed
long-term issues with effective nuclear policy in Ukraine, as this overly optimistic policy
failed due to a lack of funding and political support. In 2009, Ukrainian legislature promoted
new uranium extraction policies that encouraged domestic labor and technology, rather
than importing from Russia. In 2006, the Ukrainian government announced a plan to generate over 7,000 megawatts of additional capacity in the fifteen current reactors. Kasperski
(2015b) argues that this number was highly unlikely to be met, much like many other of
Ukraine’s recent nuclear policy goals. While Ukraine appears to have the intentions of creating a stable and independent nuclear energy sector, it appears that current policy is simply
too ambitious given current political and economic conditions. Kasperski (2015b) brings
attention to bureaucratic challenges in creating a stable nuclear policy, stating that Ukraine
has had challenges with effective policy since its independence, a point supported also by
Von Zon (2014). Nuclear energy and safety policy have been “chaotic” at best, with frequent creation, destruction, then re-creation of policies and legislative bodies. Furthermore,
there is little policy towards management of employees and bureaucrats who are involved
Nuclear Energy in Central-Eastern Europe
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with expanding nuclear energy production, creating another obstacle towards a stable and
independent system (Von Zon, 2014).
While it is clear the Ukrainian government is overwhelmingly supportive of increased nuclear energy production, Ukraine appears to continually support policy that is far
beyond its current economic and political means. In contrast, Hungary has a strong policy
foundation thanks to the European Union, where Hungary’s nuclear energy objectives are
protected despite other member state’s rejection of nuclear energy. It is in the European
Union’s interest to support Hungary and other Central-Eastern European states through
policy, as nuclear energy is arguably the most established energy source that will fulfill its
carbon emission reduction goals. It seems likely that the European Union will continue
to support Central-Eastern European states in their pursuit of expanded nuclear energy
production and consumption, as these pursuits will create a more energy efficient and connected Europe. Ukraine represents states that have received far less exterior policy support,
though there is developing legislative infrastructure to meet future economic goals for its
nuclear energy sector.
8.

Public Discourse & Opinion as a Factor in Nuclear Energy
Finally, public perception can give insight into current nuclear energy trends as
well as the future of this energy source in Eastern Europe. Though both countries are experiencing economic and political investment in nuclear energy with strong public support,
the exact parameters of this support vary greatly. Ukrainians tend to be far more conscious
of nuclear safety, while Hungarians tend to be generally less aware of the implication of
expanded nuclear energy production.
A European Commission public survey suggests that Hungarians are generally
pleased with the amount of nuclear energy being produced in their country. Around 50% of
Hungarian respondents stated that they believed nuclear energy production levels should remain as they are, while 17% desired an increase and 24% desired a decrease (European Commission, 2008). This data puts Hungarians as the country with the ninth-highest interest in
expanding nuclear energy production among the European Union member countries. Likewise, Hungary represents one of the lowest percentages of respondents in favor of reducing
nuclear energy production, behind Romania, Italy, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. Interestingly, the
European Union member countries that most supported expanding or maintaining nuclear
energy were mostly Central-Eastern European, including Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, and Bulgaria. This data suggests that the proportion of nuclear energy production
in Hungary is generally favored. Further European Commission public survey results also
suggest that Hungarian generally trust nuclear energy. 57% of Hungarian respondents stated
that they did not view nuclear energy as a “threat to them or their families” (European
Commission, 2008). According to this survey, Hungarians had the sixth-highest confidence
in nuclear energy among member states. The European Commission (2008) survey also
indicated that Hungarians reported the highest confidence in nuclear energy materials being
“sufficiently protected against misuse” (p. 27).
However, Marples' (1989) analysis of Hungarian public discourse towards nuclear
energy questions the generally positive outlook presented in the European Commission’s
survey data. In analyzing public discourse in Hungary surrounding nuclear energy, there is
a general lack of petitions, public forums, or any such public inquiries into nuclear energy.
While public reception tends to be generally positive, Marples raises concerns for the full
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/10
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extent of the public’s knowledge. The European Commission’s (2008) survey reflects a
generally positive outlook for nuclear energy, however, there was no baseline of knowledge
established for respondents. Public perception may be in favor of expanded nuclear energy
production and consumption, however, the actual construction and life extension of new
plants may generate concern (p. 34). It is easy to be enthralled by the promise of economic
stability and domestic energy independence, but the lack of public knowledge about nuclear
energy now may result in disdain or concern later on in energy production and advancement.
Of particular interest are public opinion data and discourse surrounding nuclear
energy in Ukraine, especially considering plans for economic and technological expansion
of this form of power. Though thorough public surveys regarding public interest in nuclear
energy are not available for Ukraine, several researchers have conducted independent public
opinion surveys and discourse analysis which are helpful to this essey. Kharlamova (2016),
for example, analyzed Ukrainian public opinions towards renewable energy sources. For this
particular research, nuclear energy was not considered a renewable source, however, the
survey found that Ukrainians generally have low interest in renewable energy sources like
wind and solar energy, while reporting public discontent with existing coal energy production and use.
Kasperski (2015b) raises concern for the level of public interest and awareness in
Ukraine’s ambitious nuclear plans. Ukraine has not forgotten the environmental devastation
of Chernobyl, and yet, the future of nuclear energy remains cautiously optimistic in this
country. The most publicly controversial nuclear energy project conducted in Ukraine was
the re-opening of the Pripyat plant of Chernobyl, due to energy shortage in the early 1990s,
as Kasperski has found. These shortages were caused by economic and political instability
after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian public expressed severe concern for the
safety of this project, and from there Ukrainian Parliament considered health implications
and public concerns as reasons to potentially override a nuclear project. However, in 1993,
a moratorium on nuclear reactor construction was lifted by the Ukrainian parliament, which
was contrary to the public sentiment that any use of the Pripyat plant should be avoided.2
Despite these two vastly different public approaches to nuclear energy expansion, it seems
that the Ukrainian public is generally receptive to increasing economic and political independence through this energy method. Nuclear energy has progressively been viewed as an
opportunity for Ukrainian “self-sufficiency and sovereignty,” rather than a symbol of Russian or Soviet control (Kasperski, 2015b).
While public opinion in Ukraine generally appears to suggest a pro-nuclear-power
stance, there are concerns that this public opinion is more anti-Russian than pro-nuclear.
In terms of Eastern European nuclear trends, the public seems to be generally in favor of
increased nuclear energy production and consumption. As seen in the cases of Hungary
and Ukraine, the exact reasons for public support of nuclear projects depends on historical
and political context in each country. Based on public discourse and survey results, it seems
that Hungarians are not overly concerned with safety and operating procedures of nuclear
energy plants, supporting this energy source as a means of expanded economic opportunity
and stability. Ukrainians are cautiously optimistic about expanding nuclear energy use, with
2 In fairness to the Ukrainian government, the Pripyat plant utilized technology that was antiquated even by
1993, and plants constructed using mid-20th century Soviet technology were being decommissioned and replaced
regardless (Kasperski, 2015a).
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the pain of the Chernobyl disaster still present in public discourse. However, the idea of
nuclear energy as a means to obtain a more sovereign and stronger Ukraine maintain public
support. While every Eastern European country will have various concerns and degrees of
public discourse, themes of economic strength are present everywhere. It is necessary for
the public of any country to first support the economic potential for nuclear energy, then be
convinced that this energy is safe and sustainable. Evidence for this claim is also found in the
European Commission survey data for Western European states like France and Germany.
In these countries, the public generally has concerns about the safety of nuclear energy and
desires greater plant decommissioning, as nuclear energy is not as economically strong as it
is in Eastern Europe.
9.

Concluding the Cases of Hungary & Ukraine
Hungary and Ukraine are in complicated yet promising positions. Both countries
deal with the legacy of communism in their energy sectors, in addition to the Russian influence felt in other aspects of Eastern European life. Ukraine desires growth and stability
without Russian influence, and hopes to establish a Ukrainian-driven economy. Hungary
desires a stronger economy and stability as well; however, it is tied to the European Union
and other Eastern European countries. Nuclear energy with its associated infrastructure
and investment interest, has the potential to generate economic benefits for both countries.
While economic interests are the primary drivers of increased production and consumption of nuclear energy, social and legislative factors complement these interests. In the next
few decades, it seems more likely for Hungary to develop a stronger nuclear energy sector
thanks to European Union legislation and investment interests. While Ukraine has a more
prominent nuclear energy sector currently, it seems that substantial reductions in economic
reliance on Russia will require significant economic investment as well as more effective
legislation.
10. Implications for Central-Eastern Europe and for the Future of Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy enjoys political, economic, and social support in Central-Eastern
Europe, as evidenced by this analysis. The next obstacle to increased nuclear energy production will most likely be environmental. This paper did not delve into environmental
consequences of nuclear energy, as research indicated that many Central-Eastern European countries are not overly concerned with this aspect. However, there are concerns of
groundwater pollution, earthquakes, and air contamination from the fusion process that
generates nuclear energy. Hungarian scholars have expressed concern for the Paks plant
and the health of groundwater due to nuclear energy, as the effects of such expansion have
not been fully studied (Hajdin, 2016). Indeed, it appears concerning that public discourse
has generally not considered environmental impact, even if this disregard is understandable
considering the potential for economic and political sovereignty through nuclear energy.
Bauer (2012) assesses that world nuclear power production will increase 37-110%
by 2035. In order to meet the European Union's energy goals, it seems that member states
must capitalize on expanding nuclear sectors. Most nuclear power plants only have a projected lifetime of 30-35 years, so refurbishment is a necessity in addition to investment in
new plants. The demand for energy in general will only increase, and relying on fossil fuels
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/10
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is both detrimental to the EU’s economy and to the environment (Kaygusuz, 2008).
Nuclear energy is a chance for recovery, growth, and strength for Eastern Europe.
Given renewed interest and rebuilt trust in this form of energy, it seems that substantial economic growth is the main factor behind increased nuclear trends. It is a matter of managing
investments, maintaining public support, and finding legislative support to keep this chance
alive. It seems that nuclear energy is intrinsically entwined in the fears and hopes of so many.
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